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In response to Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the 
Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (2013). 
 
It is a great pleasure to comment on a recent paper by Professors 
Vázquez and Vladeck.1 We think the Article offers an important contribu-
tion to Bivens scholarship, an excellent description of recent developments 
in the lower courts, a useful exploration of the too often overlooked 
connection between Bivens and the Westfall Act,2 a first-rate account of 
qualified immunity, and a challenging claim about the preservation of 
state law rights of action. 
Indeed, Vázquez and Vladeck’s Article has much in common with our 
own work on the Bivens doctrine.3 For example, we have argued that, in 
a pre-Bivens world, litigants could mount state common law tort claims 
as-of-right against federal officials and use such claims to test the 
constitutionality of federal action; Vázquez and Vladeck agree.4 We have 
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Vázquez and Stephen Vladeck for their generous response to this piece, and to Alex Reinert for 
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1 Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the 
Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (2013). 
2 See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall 
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
3 See generally James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009). 
4 Compare id. at 134 (advancing that “[i]n 1971 and for much of the nation’s history, state 
common law provided victims with a right of action that . . . could eventually result in the 
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argued that the Erie decision5 played an important (and too often neglected) 
role in the Court’s decision to federalize the Bivens action by limiting the 
federal courts’ flexible management of the remedy; Vázquez and Vladeck 
agree.6 We have argued that the Westfall Act confirms the viability of the 
Bivens action, thus providing important legislative support for such litiga-
tion and underscoring the Court’s conclusion that the Federal Tort Claims 
Act does not displace Bivens; Vázquez and Vladeck agree.7 We have argued 
that, to the extent the Westfall Act displaced state common law rights of 
action, the Act fundamentally transforms the Bivens inquiry and casts 
serious doubt on recent decisions by the Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts to use special factors analysis in declining to extend the doctrine; 
Vázquez and Vladeck agree.8 Both papers conclude that, to the extent that 
state common law claims have been truly displaced, federal courts should be 
more willing to recognize the existence of a federal Bivens right of action; 
indeed, we all agree that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance lends 
support to such recognition.9 Finally, we have argued that the routine 
 
vindication of their constitutional rights” by treating the constitutional violation as “invalidat[ing] 
any authority conferred by federal law”), with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 531 (“From the 
beginning of the nation’s history, federal (and state) officials have been subject to common law 
suits . . . on the theory that the government lacks the power to authorize violations of the 
Constitution.”). For a discussion of federal court damages actions stemming from unconstitutional 
taxes, see Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 
YALE L.J. 77, 135-37 (1997).  
5
 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1938). 
6 Compare James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional 
Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387, 1415 (2010) (“Erie created the very real possibility that in 
tort suits aimed at enforcing constitutional rights, both the right to sue the federal official and the 
incidents of official liability would be governed by state law.”), with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra 
note 1, at 541 (noting that the decision to frame remedial issues in state law terms after Erie “tied” 
the federal courts to “state precedents” and prevented them from taking account of “the federal 
interests involved, including the need to give efficacy to the Constitution”). 
7 Compare Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 134-37 (arguing that the language of the 
Westfall Act preserves the Bivens action by creating an explicit exception for suits for “violations 
of the Constitution”), with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 570 (explaining that “[a]ll agree 
that” the saving provision of the Westfall Act “preserved Bivens claims”). 
8 Compare Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 136 (“Congress has eliminated the state 
common law option and has failed to replace it with suits under the FTCA to vindicate constitu-
tional rights.”), with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 566 (recognizing that “the Westfall Act 
has come to be read as preempting all nonfederal remedies against federal officials acting within 
the scope of their employment”). 
9 Compare Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 138 (invoking the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance and the associated presumption in favor of judicial review of constitutional claims to 
support an interpretation of the Westfall Act as confirming the “presumptive viability of the 
Bivens action”), with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 573-74, 579 (invoking the doctrine of 
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recognition of a Bivens right of action would not necessarily deprive the 
federal courts of their ability to tailor defenses to take account of relevant 
federal interests; Vázquez and Vladeck agree.10 
With so much in common, perhaps a comment on Vázquez and Vla-
deck would seem to amount to little more than a declaration of mutual 
admiration. But while we have great admiration for the work of Vázquez 
and Vladeck in general,11 as well as for Vázquez and Vladeck’s Article in 
particular, we also differ on some important points. Most significantly, we 
disagree with Vázquez and Vladeck about the post–Westfall Act viability 
of state common law claims brought in state court against federal officials 
to vindicate constitutional rights. Vázquez and Vladeck regard such claims 
as having been saved by the language in the Westfall Act that preserves 
the right of individuals to bring suits against federal officials “for a 
violation of the Constitution of the United States.”12 In contrast, we view 
the savings language as exclusively preserving an implied federal Bivens 
right of action in federal (or state) court. The Westfall Act immunity was 
designed, we think, to apply broadly, displacing all state common law 
actions against federal employees, whether or not such actions seek to 
vindicate a constitutional right. 
In responding to Vázquez and Vladeck’s argument that state common 
law claims that seek to vindicate the Constitution survived the Westfall 
Act, we begin with a brief overview of our argument. We think the text, 
structure, and history of the Westfall Act all point in a single direction: the 
foreclosure of all state common law claims against federal officials for 
actions within the scope of their official duties. We think the only claims 
against federal officials saved by the Westfall Act were those based on 
federal rights of action, including constitutional tort claims under Bivens 
and federal statutory claims otherwise authorized. Such a reading not only 
comports with text and history, but also gives effect to the evident 
purpose of the Westfall Act. The point of the Act, after all, was to secure 
 
constitutional avoidance in defending a reading of the Westfall Act that would make constitutional 
tort remedies more broadly available). 
10 Compare Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 124-25, 139-50 (describing a range of doc-
trines, including qualified immunity and implied preemption, that federal officers could invoke as 
defenses to a presumptively available Bivens action), with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 578 
(calling on the courts to “presume[e] the availability of a damages remedy for violation of 
constitutional rights and channeling all possible reasons for limiting or denying such claims into 
the immunity, privilege, or preemption analyses”). 
11 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Fifty Years (More or Less) of “Federal Courts”: An Anniversary 
Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1083, 1119-20 (2002) (expressing admiration for the doctrinal 
sophistication in Vázquez’s work). 
12 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 571 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2006)). 
17 P&B Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013 5:05 PM 
234 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 231 
 
federal employees’ absolute immunity from suits based on state common 
law (an immunity the Westfall Court had previously rejected).13 The 
exceptions in 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) were fashioned to preserve existing 
federal law remedies.14 We explore the Act’s text, structure, and judicial 
reception in the next three parts. 
I. RESPONDING TO THE TEXTUAL ARGUMENT 
In their textual argument, Vázquez and Vladeck identify two kinds of 
claims: (1) a state common law claim in which the alleged conduct violates 
state tort law and also happens to violate the federal constitution; (2) a state 
common law claim specifically for violation of the federal constitution, 
comparable, say to an action on a statute.15 Vázquez and Vladeck contend that 
both of these actions are actions “brought for a violation of the Constitution 
of the United States” within the meaning of Westfall Act exception.16 But 
will the language of the statute bear that meaning? Consider the interests the 
plaintiff would be seeking to vindicate in the first sort of state law claim.17 
Such state law trespass, battery, and false imprisonment claims seek to 
vindicate a state law interest in bodily integrity and liberty. To make out the 
elements of a viable claim under state law, the plaintiff need not establish that 
the Constitution was violated. True, the plaintiff may have to show a consti-
tutional violation to recover damages; otherwise the official immunity defense 
of the federal officer could bar recovery. But reliance on a constitutional 
rejoinder to an immunity defense that the official may or may not assert does 
not obviously make the initial action one “for a violation of the Constitution.” 
Moreover, so long as state law controls the measure of damages, a showing 
that the officer violated the Constitution would only trump an immunity 
defense but would not, by hypothesis, alter the remedial calculus. While we 
agree with Vázquez and Vladeck that such common law actions traditionally 
 
13 See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 296-98 (1988), superseded by statute, Westfall Act, Pub. 
L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-700, at 2-4 (1988) (explaining that the purpose of Westfall Act was to “provide 
immunity for Federal employees from personal liability for common law torts committed within 
the scope of their employment” and to “amend the [FTCA] to address the potential liability of 
Federal employees which results from the Westfall decision”). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) provides that the exclusivity provision in § 2679(b)(1) does not 
apply to “civil action against an employee of the Government, (A) which is brought for a violation 
of the Constitution of the United States, or (B) which is brought for a violation of a statute of the 
United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.” 
15 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 536-39. 
16 See id. at 514 (quoting Westfall Act § 5, 102 Stat. at 4564). 
17 See id. at 572. 
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provided an important vehicle for the protection and articulation of 
constitutional values,18 we think it stretches the language of the Westfall 
Act to characterize such an action as one “brought for” a constitutional 
violation when the interests at issue and measure of relief are defined by 
state, rather than federal, law. 
Vázquez and Vladeck hypothesize a second sort of state law action, 
something comparable to an action on a statute.19 Here, Vázquez and 
Vladeck admittedly come closer to identifying a state law right of action 
that could be plausibly characterized as “brought for” a constitutional 
violation within the meaning of the Westfall Act.20 The constitutional 
violation would appear as an element of the plaintiff’s claim and the remedy 
would presumably take account of the constitutional interests involved.21 
But we have not seen state laws or decisions that seek to facilitate this type 
of litigation and did not see any such state authority discussed in Vázquez 
and Vladeck’s Article.22 To be sure, Vázquez and Vladeck suggest that a 
state may owe a positive duty to provide such rights of action in order to 
avoid discriminating against federal law in violation of the Court’s Suprema-
cy Clause jurisprudence.23 But the Court’s Supremacy Clause cases focus on 
the state’s (discriminatory) refusal to entertain an existing federal right of 
action in circumstances where the state would hear a similar state right of 
action.24 None of the cases affirmatively obligates the state to fashion a state 
 
18 See, e.g., id. at 540 (“[B]ecause the common law was characterized by its flexibility, it could 
be molded to the exigencies of constitutional litigation.”). 
19 See id. at 539. 
20 For reasons discussed below, we do not think such claims would survive the Westfall Act’s 
exclusivity provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
21 Even here, though, one could quibble. Vázquez and Vladeck rely on Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson to illustrate an action on a statute, but in that case the 
plaintiff alleged that the violation of a federal statute raised a “rebuttable presumption of 
negligence” made actionable under state tort law. See id. at 539 n.143 (quoting Merrell Dow 
Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805-06 (1986)). It appears that such an action would 
seek to vindicate a state law interest in preventing the negligent infliction of harm rather 
than a federal interest in properly labeled drugs. 
22 See id. at 539 & n.143 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 
(1965) and PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 220 (W. Page 
Keeton et al. eds, 5th ed. 1984), both of which recognize the possibility that a negligence 
action might be used to enforce statutory or regulatory rights, but failing to identify any 
state court decisions that have extended the idea to the use of intentional torts to vindicate 
federal constitutional rights). 
23 See id. at 537 & n.132. Here again, Vázquez and Vladeck’s example deals with state law 
claims of negligence rather than the intentional torts that would undergird many Bivens claims. 
24 See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740-41 (2009) (concluding that the state cannot 
refuse to entertain a federal § 1983 claim against state prison officials, even where it created an 
alternative regime for the imposition of prison-based liability on the state instead of its employees); 
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law right of action to vindicate federal interests.25 We thus find little reason 
to regard the state law claims to which Vázquez and Vladeck point as more 
than simply hypothetical, and it seems unlikely that Congress wrote a 
provision into the Westfall Act to save these claims from displacement. 
These textual conclusions find ample support in the structure of the 
Westfall Act’s exclusivity and preemption provisions. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE 
 OF THE WESTFALL ACT 
The Westfall Act proceeds on a simple distinction between state common 
law rights of action (which are displaced) and federal rights of action (which 
are preserved). The language of the Act contains two moving parts: the first 
declares the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) remedy exclusive for all 
claims for injuries resulting from the “negligent or wrongful act or omission 
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his 
office or employment.”26 This language duplicates earlier sections in the 
FTCA that use identical language.27 To highlight the connection between 
the exclusivity rule and the liability rule, § 2679(b) of the Westfall Act 
specifically refers to § 1346(b) and § 2672 of the FTCA as the statutory 
source of the exclusive remedy.28 The first element of the Westfall Act thus 
establishes a regime of FTCA exclusivity for claims based on state common 
law. As we explain below, the Act perfects this regime of exclusivity for 
state common law claims by creating a system for the substitution of the 
federal government as the defendant and transformation of the claim into 
one arising under the FTCA.29 
Apart from its scheme of exclusivity, the Westfall Act contains a much 
broader preclusion provision that was drafted to apply to all conceivable 
claims one might bring against a federal employee. That provision declares 
that “[a]ny other civil action or proceeding . . . arising out of or relating to 
the same subject matter . . . is precluded without regard to when the act or 
 
see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-90 (1947) (holding that federal laws are presumptive-
ly enforceable in state courts). 
25 Indeed, in perhaps the closest analogy, the Court permitted Maine to refuse to entertain a 
federal suit for damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act in part on the ground that no such 
right of action could proceed in federal court under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. See 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).  
26 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006). 
27 Cf. id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2672. 
28 See id. § 2679(b)(1). 
29 See infra text accompanying note 33. 
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omission occurred.”30 The purpose of the preclusion provision is entirely 
straightforward; after making the (limited) FTCA remedy exclusive and 
securing that exclusivity through substitution of the government as a 
defendant, the Westfall Act foreclosed any other civil liability in suits 
brought against government employees for actions taken within the scope of 
their office. It was this absolute immunity for federal employees that the 
Court had denied in its Westfall decision and that Congress chose to confer 
by statute.31 But while the preclusion provision was broad enough to 
foreclose all claims based upon state law rights of action against federal 
employees (without regard to whether the claims in question were actionable 
under the FTCA), it also posed a threat to the federal Bivens right of action. 
The provision thus necessitated the creation of the two savings provisions 
that appear in subsection (b)(2): one for Bivens constitutional tort actions 
and one for otherwise authorized federal statutory rights of action.32 In 
short, the Westfall Act appears to be drawing a simple distinction between 
state common law rights of action (actionable exclusively in suits under the 
FTCA) and federal rights of action (actionable under Bivens and other 
relevant federal statutory authority). 
Subsequent provisions of the Westfall Act confirm that Congress was 
drawing a line between state and federal law rights of action. The Westfall 
Act enforces its regime of state common law tort claims by setting out 
representation, certification, and substitution procedures that force the 
plaintiff to pursue common law claims against the Government rather than 
against the employee.33 When one examines these representation, certifica-
tion, and substitution provisions, one can see that they were meant to apply 
to state law rights of action against a federal employee for a negligent or 
wrongful act as to which subsection (b) had declared the FTCA remedy 
exclusive, and not to federal rights of action, such as Bivens claims.  
Following the paragraph that saves Bivens actions from the FTCA’s ex-
clusive remedial scheme, the Westfall Act creates an additional set of 
protections for federal officers sued in state court. To begin with, the 
Westfall Act requires the federal government to defend employees sued for 
actions taken in the scope of their employment.34 The next provision calls 
upon the Attorney General of the United States to issue a certification, 
when applicable, that a federal employee sued in state court was acting 
 
30 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). 
31 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the Westfall decision and the stated 
purpose of the Westfall Act). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A), (B). 
33 See id. § 2679 (c), (d). 
34 See id. § 2679 (c). 
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within the scope of his office.35 Once such a certification has been issued, 
“any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court 
shall be removed” to federal court and the action shall be deemed one 
“brought against the United States” under the FTCA and “the United 
States shall be substituted as the party defendant.”36 This rather sweeping 
language suggests that state court civil actions or proceedings are subject to 
certification, removal, and transformation. Notably, the provisions for 
removal and transformation depend on a certification that the claim arose 
out of an action taken in the line of duty, an essential element to any 
constitutional claim. But the provisions do not include an exception for 
suits brought in state court for a violation of the Constitution.37 
When read as a whole, however, the Westfall Act makes clear that 
Bivens claims are preserved against individual officers and not subject to the 
provisions of subsection (d). Subsection (b) applies to claims for “injury or 
loss of property, or personal injury or death” resulting from a negligent or 
wrongful act committed by the defendant within the scope of office;38 as we 
have seen, this language tracks the FTCA provisions subjecting the Gov-
ernment to liability for state common law tort claims.39 Subsection (c) of 
the Westfall Act picks up this language, declaring that DOJ “shall defend” 
any action brought against a federal employee “for any such damage or 
injury.”40 The reference to “such” damage or injury links the duty to defend 
to the claims for property damage and personal injury that were declared 
exclusively cognizable under the FTCA in subsection (b)(1), not those 
exceptions carved out in subsection (b)(2). This interpretation is borne out 
by the DOJ’s position that it has no obligation to defend DOJ employees 
sued on a Bivens claim, but provides representation (and indemnity) only 
where doing so advances the interests of the Government and comports 
with applicable regulations.41 Again, we see a statutory distinction between 
state common law claims and claims based on federal rights of action. 
 
35 See id. § 2679 (d)(1). 
36 Id. § 2679 (d)(2). 
37 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 135-36. 
38 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b)(1). 
39 Id. § 1346(b)(1). 
40 Id. § 2679(c) (emphasis added). 
41 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (2012) (stating that the Attorney General has discretion to pro-
vide representation to officials sued in their individual capacities); see also Cornelia T.L. Pillard, 
Taking Fiction Seriously: the Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 
GEO. L.J. 65, 76-78 (1999) (describing the regulations that govern indemnification of federal 
employees in Bivens litigation); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and 
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A similar distinction underlies subsection (d), which sets out the actual 
machinery of FTCA exclusivity. Following notice to the DOJ of the 
pendency of the action, subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) require the DOJ to 
certify that claims pending in state or federal court against a federal em-
ployee were based on actions taken “within the scope of his office or 
employment.”42 Following the issuance of such a scope-of-office certifica-
tion, the Act provides that the action shall be “deemed an action against the 
United States [under the FTCA]” and the United States “shall be substituted 
as the party defendant.”43 And in the case of an action pending in state 
court, the Act further provides that the certification shall trigger removal of 
the action to federal court.44 Although the Act thus embraces claims 
brought in both state and federal court, it limits the certification, removal, 
and substitution provisions to any civil action “commenced upon such 
claim.”45 In all three provisions, in short, the limiting reference to claims 
clarifies that the procedures apply only to state common law proceedings 
deemed exclusively cognizable under the FTCA. In keeping with the intent 
of the drafters then, the Westfall Act does not bring federal Bivens claims 
for constitutional torts within the framework of FTCA exclusivity, and it 
does not provide for certification, removal, and substitution of the govern-
ment as a defendant in Bivens claims. 
With this simple distinction between state and federal law rights of ac-
tion, coupled with the transformation of state common law claims into 
claims against the government under the FTCA, Congress foreclosed the 
assertion of state law–based constitutional tort claims. As we noted in our 
earlier paper, the statutorily required substitution of the federal government 
as a defendant in state common law causes of action will prove fatal to 
constitutional claims.46 Congress has never subjected the government to 
liability for constitutional torts; a series of decisions confirm that the waiver 
of sovereign immunity in the FTCA does not extend to constitutional tort 
claims.47 The Westfall Act, moreover, expressly permits the government to 
 
Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 850 n.185 (2010) (listing a 
host of regulations concerning the indemnification of federal employees). 
42 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), (2). 
43 Id. § 2679(d)(1). 
44 Id. § 2679(d)(2). 
45 Id. § 2679(d)(1), (2) (emphasis added). 
46 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 135 (explaining that “[a] long line of cases hold 
that constitutional claims for damages may not be brought against the federal government itself” 
and therefore, “the failure of Congress to provide a clear statement authorizing constitutional suits 
against the government has proven fatal to their assertion”). 
47 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994) (rejecting a Bivens claim against a 
federal agency). 
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assert all of its defenses to liability following its post-substitution appear-
ance as a defendant in the proceeding. Subsection (d)(4) provides that, 
[u]pon certification, any action or proceeding subject to paragraph (1), (2), 
or (3) shall proceed in the same manner as any action against the United 
States filed pursuant to section 1346(b) . . . and shall be subject to the limi-
tations and exceptions applicable to those actions.48 
Simply put, the fact that an individual cannot recover from the government 
under the FTCA will not prevent the substitution of the government as the 
proper defendant in an action based on state common law.49 Well-advised 
attorneys will forego state common law claims, except those that plausibly 
seek to impose a form of government liability cognizable under the FTCA. 
Here then lies the problem with Vázquez and Vladeck’s argument for 
the preservation of state common law claims to vindicate constitutional 
rights. The transformation and substitution provisions of subsection (d) do 
not contain any exception to preserve state common law actions seeking to 
vindicate constitutional rights. Congress left the Bivens action (and other, 
statutory federal rights of action) outside the scheme of exclusivity in 
subsection (b) and the certification, transformation, and substitution provi-
sions of subsection (d), but brought all state common law actions within 
these provisions’ terms. So long as the state law right of action falls within 
the scope of the Westfall Act’s proclamation of exclusivity, certification, 
transformation, and substitution, the ultimate substitution of the federal 
government as a defendant will foreclose individual liability and authorize 
government liability only in keeping with the provisions of the FTCA.50 
One final element of the Westfall Act confirms that Congress declined 
to save state common law constitutional tort claims as it did Bivens claims. 
In drafting the Westfall Act, Congress clearly confronted the question of 
what state common law rights of action to preserve. It resolved that ques-
tion by preserving only claims that arise from conduct outside the scope of 
 
48 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(4). 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991) (applying the FTCA to bar a 
medical malpractice claim against both the government and the federal doctor). 
50 One might ask what prevents a Bivens claim from falling into the certification and substi-
tution regime of subsection (d). The answer lies in the Court’s conclusion that, as federal rights of 
action, Bivens claims are simply not “cognizable” under the FTCA’s provision for suits based upon 
state common law and thus do not trigger the certification and substitution provisions of the Act. 
See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476-79 (construing meaning of “cognizable” under the FTCA and holding 
that Bivens claims are not cognizable). 
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the employee’s official duties;51 that is, Congress (quite properly) preserved 
the common law tort, contract, and property liability of federal employees 
for action those employees take in their private capacities. (For instance, 
imagine the federal employee who faces liability on a contract for the sale of 
a private home or for an automobile accident on a weekend trip to the 
mall.) Congress implemented this exception through the certification and 
remand provisions of subsection (d); in brief, if the DOJ declines to certify 
that the action was taken within the scope of office, then the transformation 
provisions do not apply and the suit remains one against the employee in 
his or her personal capacity under state law.52 
One could argue, of course, that a statute that forecloses the assertion of 
constitutional claims would violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause. Scholars generally agree that colorable claims of constitutional 
dimension cannot be entirely zoned out of the courts, state or federal,53 and 
the federal courts have expressed general agreement with that view.54 But 
the removal and transformation provisions of the Westfall Act apply only to 
state law claims;55 they leave litigants entirely free to mount federal consti-
tutional tort claims in federal (or state) court, hence the exception for 
actions brought “for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.”56 
The Bivens option, needless to say, would appear to answer any due process 
concerns. Congress can presumably channel constitutional tort claims into 
the federal arena, and having made that avenue available, foreclose access to 
state law for the assertion of such claims. We do not mean to disparage the 
due process argument; indeed, to the extent that the statute forecloses some 
forms of common law tort liability against officers and fails to restore that 
 
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (making claims exclusive under the FTCA only when the disputed 
actions were committed while an employee was “acting within the scope of his office or employment”). 
52 As an additional protection, the employee can petition the court to find that the action occurred 
within the scope of his office, and transformation will occur if the court so finds. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3). 
53 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLO-
CATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 42-47 (2d ed., Michie Co. 1990) (1980); Lawrence Gene Sager, 
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to 
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 70-71 (1981). 
54 See, e.g., Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (stat-
ing that its decision avoided the “serious constitutional question” that would arise if Congress 
denied any judicial forum for the resolution of constitutional claims (citations omitted)); Johnson 
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974) (applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to find 
that there was not general preclusion of constitutional challenges under a statute that purported to 
make benefit determinations by the Veterans’ Administration final and unreviewable). 
55 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) provides for substitution of the United States as a 
defendant upon the Attorney General’s certification. As discussed above, this provision applies to 
any state common law action. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45. 
56 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b)(2)(A). 
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liability under the FTCA, constitutional concerns do arise.57 We only 
suggest that the foreclosure of the state law option for constitutional tort 
claims does not raise such concerns. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE WESTFALL ACT 
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the Westfall Act confirm both 
the operation of the Act’s removal and transformation provisions and the 
scope of the constitutional tort exception. To begin with, the Court has 
consistently treated the FTCA as the exclusive means of redress for injuries 
caused by federal employees within the scope of office, subject to an excep-
tion that the Court has characterized as applicable to Bivens claims. In 
Smith, for example, the Court described the two exceptions in the following 
terms: “(1) a Bivens action, seeking damages for a constitutional violation by 
a Government employee; or (2) an action under a federal statute that 
authorizes recovery against a Government employee.”58 Similarly, in Hui v. 
Castaneda, the Court distinguished a specialized liability scheme for public 
health employees from the remedial scheme of the Westfall Act, pointing 
out that the latter includes a Bivens action.59  
Apart from these decisions about the meaning of the constitutional tort 
exception, the Court has ascribed broad immunizing force to the Westfall 
Act’s preclusion of state law claims. Thus, in Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
Lamagno, the Court explained that “Congress was notably concerned with 
the significance of the scope-of-employment inquiry—that is, it wanted the 
employee’s personal immunity to turn on that question alone.”60 This statement 
equates the employee’s immunity with actions taken in the scope of em-
ployment and suggests that such actions cannot give rise to individual tort 
liability at common law. Finally, the Court has explained why these im-
munizing substitution rules do not apply to Bivens actions: wholly apart 
 
57 For this reason, we agree with Vázquez and Vladeck’s analysis that the lower courts are 
wrongheaded in their increasingly chary approach to Bivens claims in the absence of other 
remedies, as we outlined in Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication. See 
Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 149-50; Vázquez and Vladeck, supra note 1, at 550-51. 
58 United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991) (footnote omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2679(b)(2) (1988)). 
59 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1851 (2010). 
60 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995) (second emphasis added); see also Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 
238-41 (2007) (explaining that a proper scope-of-employment certification by the DOJ conclusively 
forecloses common law suits against individual officers). 
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from the constitutional tort exception, a Bivens action is not “cognizable” 
under the FTCA because it does not rely on state common law.61 
The Court’s recent decision in Minneci v. Pollard62 points in the same 
direction, as Vázquez and Vladeck gamely admit.63 There, the Court 
considered the viability of a Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment 
against private prison officials.64 The Court acknowledged that prisoners 
would have a Bivens claim against federal prison employees for cruel and 
unusual punishment under Carlson v. Green.65 But the Court distinguished 
the situation presented in Carlson from that in Pollard on the basis of the 
viability of alternative state common law remedies.66 In the case of harms 
inflicted by private prisons, state law tort remedies would remain available. 
In contrast, the Court relied on the Westfall Act in concluding that prison 
inmates “ordinarily cannot bring state-law tort actions against employees of 
the Federal Government.”67 The Court’s analysis thus confirms the simple 
dichotomy that we find in the Westfall Act: state law tort claims against 
federal employees have been displaced, but federal rights of action under 
Bivens have been preserved.68 
 
61 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (drawing a sharp distinction between 
the federal character of a Bivens action and the state law character of claims under the FTCA 
and concluding that Bivens claims are not cognizable under the FTCA). Vázquez and Vladeck 
argue that the Meyer Court was “clearly incorrect” in suggesting that federal law provides the 
“source of liability” for constitutional tort claims. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 553-54. 
But the Meyer Court was writing in 1994, well after the Westfall Act arguably displaced the 
tradition of presumptively available state common law actions to which Vázquez & Vladeck 
point in questioning the Court’s conclusion. 
62
 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012). 
63 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 514 n.19, 515 & n.22, 570. 
64 See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 623. 
65 See id. (citing Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14 (1980)). 
66 See id. at 623-25. 
67 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679(b)(1) and Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 238, 241 (2007)). 
68 Vázquez and Vladeck agree with us that the Court has relied on the viability of state law 
tort claims in the course of rejecting a Bivens action. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550-52 
(2007) (citing its own decision in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 535 U.S. 61 (2001) for the 
proposition that the availability of state common law remedies was relevant to the Bivens analysis, 
but acknowledging that Wyoming law would not necessarily provide a state tort remedy for 
malicious prosecution against federal officials). Compare Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 570-
71, with Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 128. Vázquez and Vladeck argue that the Wilkie 
decision may represent a considered recognition of the viability of state law constitutional tort 
claims rather than a mistaken failure to recognize the preemptive impact of the Westfall Act on 
state law claims. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 570-71. But there’s nothing in the opinion 
to suggest that the Wilkie Court viewed the invocation of the federal constitution as the key to the 
ongoing viability of state law tort claims. The Court never acknowledged the possibility that the 
Westfall Act displaces state tort claims against federal employees and never mentioned the 
hypothesis that such displacement was prevented by the Westfall Act exception for constitutional 
claims. Moreover, although Vázquez and Vladeck suggest that these issues were briefed to the 
 
17 P&B Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013 5:05 PM 
244 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 231 
 
A similar state–federal dichotomy informs other aspects of the FTCA 
regime. Consider first a set of FTCA cases involving the interplay between 
the discretionary-function exception and claims of constitutional violation. 
In brief, the discretionary-function exception shields the federal govern-
ment from liability under the FTCA when the alleged injuries arose from 
the exercise of official discretion.69 While the lower federal courts are 
divided on the issue of whether the exception applies when conduct violates 
the Constitution,70 none has suggested that the FTCA claims at issue in 
those cases (for assault, false imprisonment, and the like) should be regarded 
as constitutional tort claims that fall within the scope of the Westfall Act’s 
exception. If Vázquez and Vladeck’s reading of the Westfall exception were 
correct, one might anticipate that courts cabining the discretionary-function 
exception for unconstitutional conduct might logically recognize the claim 
as one “brought for” a violation of the Constitution and limit official 
immunity.71 Yet this is not, in practice, what has happened. Suffice it to say 
that no court has yet treated the introduction of constitutional defenses to 
FTCA immunities as transforming the state law claim into one “brought 
for” a violation of the Constitution. Note, too, that litigants frequently 
bring claims under the FTCA and under Bivens as part of the same proceeding, 
seeking remedies for the same alleged government misconduct.72 If Vázquez 
and Vladeck are right about the transformative quality of alleged constitu-
tional violations, we would expect federal courts to conceptualize the FTCA 
claim as one that involves a violation of the Constitution. 
 
Court, id. at 571 n.325, the briefs simply refer in passing to the FTCA and the Westfall Act 
without addressing the impact of those statutes on the viability of state tort claims or highlighting 
the possibility of Westfall Act displacement. See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 
(No. 06-219), 2007 WL 128587; Brief for Respondent at 40-41, Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 (No. 06-219), 
2007 WL 550926. We think the Wilkie Court simply misunderstood the statutory framework and 
little weight should be accorded to its (mistaken) assumption about the viability of state tort 
remedies, which appears to rest on the Malesko Court’s recognition of the presumptive availability 
of such remedies against private prison firms. 
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006); see also, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 
536-37 (1988). 
70 See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Dennis, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing whether the exception 
should apply when officials’ actions are unconstitutional). 
71 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 537.  
72 See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 355 (2006) (dismissing for want of appellate juris-
diction a district court decision that recognized the right of individuals to pursue both FTCA and 
Bivens liability for the same alleged misconduct); Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430, 438 
(7th Cir. 2008) (treating the FTCA judgment bar as a barrier to Bivens liability in a case where the 
district court entered judgment for the government on a related FTCA claim). 
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To summarize, the statute appears to use a fairly simple sorting device. 
For claims arising from conduct within the scope of office, state common 
law proceedings against federal officials trigger exclusivity and govern-
ment substitution under the FTCA. While the FTCA represents a waiver 
of the federal government’s sovereign immunity,73 the waiver does not 
extend to constitutional torts.74 Federal rights of action, meanwhile, may 
proceed against federal officials so long as they seek a money remedy for 
constitutional violations or violations of other authorized federal statutory 
rights. While state common law remains relevant to enforce a federal 
employee’s obligations incurred in a personal or private capacity (that is, 
outside the scope of office), no exception appears in the exclusivity 
provisions of the Westfall Act for the preservation of state common law 
claims on the basis that they seek to vindicate constitutional rights. As we 
have shown, the constitutional tort exception was written into the preclu-
sion language of the Westfall Act, but it was not written into the FTCA 
exclusivity provisions that transform state common law claims into suits 
against the government and provide for the assertion of all applicable 
governmental defenses. Vázquez and Vladeck’s mistake lies in focusing 
their analysis solely on the language of the Bivens exception rather than on 
the structure of the exclusivity provisions. 
IV. EVALUATING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Even if the signs did not point so clearly toward the conclusion that the 
Westfall Act preserves only federal Bivens claims, one can raise serious 
questions about the wisdom of continued reliance on the state common law 
option. The move away from state court litigation, begun in Bivens, has only 
accelerated over the past forty years. For example, suits to challenge official 
action under the Administrative Procedure Act are in the exclusive province 
of the federal judiciary.75 Similarly, actions for habeas and mandamus relief 
directed at federal officials presumptively begin and end in the federal 
courts.76 Indeed, state courts so rarely see actions challenging federal official 
 
73 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (subjecting the United States to tort liability “in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”). 
74 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 135 & n.102. (collecting authorities for the propo-
sition that constitutional torts against the government have been suggested but rejected as an 
alternative to the current regime). 
75 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal circuit courts of 
appeal to review certain agency actions). 
76 On the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over habeas claims challenging the legality of 
federal detention, see Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406-07 (1871). As for the exclusivity of 
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action that one can question how effectively they would handle such 
matters. In any event, the Department of Justice follows an unyielding 
practice of removing state court litigation against federal officials to federal 
court.77 So even if the state court option were preserved, current removal 
practice suggests that such a right of action would rarely, if ever, result in 
any state court litigation of constitutional tort claims.  
In fairness, Vázquez and Vladeck recognize that the state law–state court 
option would be less than ideal for reasons on which we all agree: varying 
pockets of state law could undermine uniformity and pose problems for the 
vindication of important federal interests.78 Rather than defend the state 
common law model as desirable on its own terms, Vázquez and Vladeck put 
it forward as a kind of backstop, available as a measure of the adequacy of 
federal remedies and perhaps as a fallback source of remediation when 
federal remedies fall short. We agree with the importance of providing a 
measure of the adequacy of Bivens remediation but we would instead 
encourage courts to rely upon the rich body of constitutional tort law under 
§ 1983, which regulates the conduct of state officials.79 We argue that 
federal courts should draw on this body of law in developing the Bivens 
doctrine to regulate federal official action.  
For these reasons, we believe that the remedial regime structured along 
the lines of the prevailing interpretation of the Westfall Act—with state-law 
tort claims running against the federal government (subject to the excep-
tions of the FTCA) and individual constitutional claims running against 
federal employees under Bivens—presents a simpler and more coherent 
 
federal jurisdiction over mandamus claims against federal officials, see McClung v. Silliman, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 600 (1821). 
77 See OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL § 45, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title4/civ00045.htm (“In . . . civil suits 
against government officers, employees, service personnel, and agencies, and particularly in cases 
in which personal injury, death, a significant federal interest, or property damage is involved, care 
should be taken to remove to the United States district court.”). 
78 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 573 (acknowledging that “some states may not 
recognize” various causes of action). Notably, the vagaries of state law and potential gaps in 
recovery are among the reasons why the Court in Carlson v. Green recognized a Bivens claim 
under the Eighth Amendment. See 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (“The question whether respondent's 
action for violations by federal officials of federal constitutional rights should be left to the 
vagaries of the laws of the several States admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a 
contrary congressional resolution.”). 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
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framework. In the framework we outlined in Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy 
and Constitutional Adjudication, a Bivens remedy would presumptively be 
available for constitutional claims against federal employees absent some 
other remedy provided by Congress displacing such claims, subject to 
whatever defenses and immunities may apply in a particular case.80 There-
fore, those injured by the constitutional violations of federal employees 
would have the same presumptive right to sue that § 1983 affords those 
injured by state official action.81 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, our friendly disagreement with Vázquez and Vladeck may 
turn more on tactics than on substance. After all, Vázquez and Vladeck 
reach a result broadly consistent with the approach we proposed in our 
earlier article. We argued that the federal courts should take account of the 
Westfall Act’s likely displacement of the state common law option when 
evaluating the current vitality of the Bivens action in federal court.82 
Vázquez and Vladeck agree with this conclusion.83 We differ from Vázquez 
and Vladeck primarily because we believe the state law option has been 
clearly taken off the table. This structural fact helps to support an argument 
for the presumptive viability of the Bivens action in federal court. That’s 
why we like Professor Tribe’s paraphrase, “Bivens or nothing,”84 as a way to 
capture the reality that litigation based on federal rights of action has 
become the only game in town for those who wish to challenge the constitu-
tionality of federal employees’ actions in a suit for damages.  
Unfortunately, as Vázquez and Vladeck demonstrate, the lower federal 
courts have been far too reluctant to recognize what we both believe should 
be the presumptive viability of a Bivens right of action.85 Here’s where the 
question of tactics may take center stage. By arguing for the continued 
viability of a state law constitutional tort claim, Vázquez and Vladeck offer a 
 
80 See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 3, at 139-40. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 123. 
83 Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 578. 
84 Laurence Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 59-60. 
85 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 578. In an important recent contribution to the 
literature, two scholars have supported our contention that the displacement of state common law 
remedies lends force to an argument for presumptively available relief under Bivens. See Alexander 
A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042175 
(arguing that the Court erred in Minneci in over-emphasizing the availability of state law remedies 
and suggesting several strategies for cabining the effect of that decision on future Bivens litigation). 
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framework that may make it easier for jurists to recognize a Bivens 
action. When confronted with the question, Bivens or state law, many 
jurists may respond in precisely the same way the Supreme Court did 
when it confronted that question in the Bivens case itself.86 As Vázquez 
and Vladeck so nicely show, the argument for recognition of a federal 
right of action has special force in a world where the government’s 
routine practice of removal will invariably shift the claims in question to 
a federal docket and where liability will ultimately depend on judicial 
assessments of such federal law issues as the potency of the federal right 
at issue and the scope of any federal immunity defense.87 If one views 
the claims as viable, one way or the other, the decision to federalize the 
cause of action looks far less adventuresome.  
Vázquez and Vladeck may be right in their tactical judgment. While we 
think that they have misread the preclusive force of the Westfall Act, we 
agree that a properly presumptive recognition of the right to pursue a 
Bivens action may still emerge from a clear understanding of what Congress 
meant to preserve in the Act. So far, our account has done little to persuade 
the federal courts to rethink their grudging approach to assessing the 
viability of a Bivens action. As Vázquez and Vladeck demonstrate, the lower 
federal courts consistently refuse to recognize any “novel” Bivens actions.88 
Perhaps, then, the attempt to restore an effective constitutional tort remedy 
will require further legislative intervention. If so, the work of Vázquez and 
Vladeck will provide a valuable resource in documenting the way federal 
courts have continued to undercut constitutional tort remedies that Con-
gress apparently meant to preserve. 
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86 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 1, at 513. 
87 See id. 
88 Id. at 550-51. 
